Problem definition: The recent trend in the U.S. hospital closures can have important impacts on the healthcare sector by changing the operational e ciency and quality of care of the remaining hospitals. We investigate the impact of hospital closures on the surrounding hospitals' operational e ciency and quality, and study how such hospitals respond to the closure of their neighboring hospital. Academic/Practical Relevance: Understanding how hospital closures impact the way the remaining hospitals operate can allow policymakers to utilize more e↵ective policy levers in order to mitigate the negative consequences of hospital closures. Methodology: We analyze more than 14 million inpatient visits made during 11 years to over 3,000 hospitals in the U.S. (before and after various closures), and utilize causal methods to evaluate the spillover e↵ect of hospital closures on the nearby hospitals. We also conduct counterfactual analyses to evaluate policy interventions that could have been used by policymakers. Results: Hospital closures have both positive and negative spillover e↵ects. When a hospital closes, its nearby hospitals improve their operational e ciency. However, they do so via a speed-up response (i.e., by reducing their service durations to accommodate the increased demand) instead of an e↵ort to lower their average bed idle time. This speed-up response negatively a↵ects some important aspects of the care quality provided, including the 30-day mortality rate. The spillover e↵ect of a hospital closure is highly heterogeneous: hospitals in markets where patients have limited choices of hospitals (e.g., less competition, fewer resources) and hospitals that are more desirable (e.g., high-quality, urban, teaching, and large) tend to experience greater spillover e↵ects. Managerial Implications: Our analyses suggest two e↵ective policy levers: (a) bailing out specific hospitals (e.g., rural or less desirable than neighbors) from potential closures, and (b) eliminating the speed-up response of specific hospitals (e.g., rural or more desirable hospitals). In addition to helping policymakers, our results help hospital administrators: our findings help them to better understand the consequences (or the absence) of their strategic responses to a neighboring hospital closure, and thereby, adopt more suitable management strategies.
Introduction
A substantial number of U.S. hospitals have closed in the past decade (Kaufman et al. 2016 , Friedman et al. 2016 , MedPAC 2017 . Such closures have occurred widely across the nation a↵ecting a large number of people (see, e.g., Figure 1 ) (MedPAC 2017). Since U.S. hospitals are facing multiple challenges, including decreasing demand for inpatient services and elevated financial pressures Article submitted to ; manuscript no.
Data and Empirical Challenges
There are several empirical challenges for studying the impact of hospital closures. First, although studies have examined rural hospital closures or closures in specific geographic areas (Kaufman et al. 2016 , Lindrooth et al. 2003 , Capps et al. 2010 , Carroll 2019 , Gujral and Basu 2019 , no public data keeps track of all U.S. hospital closures. Thus, we have independently identified closed hospitals through our own research and various validation steps. As an example, we first identified potentially closed hospitals through Medicare Provider of Service (POS) data and Medicare fee-for-service (FFS) claims data and verified each closure separately through multiple sources including local news, state department documents, or findings from research institutions. Next, we used a nationally representative, multi-year patient, hospital, and area level data to improve the generalizability of our findings. Specifically, we used the 20% sample of Medicare FFS claims data, which cover the majority of the U.S. population in ages 65 and older. We then linked the claims dataset to our hospital level data (from POS, Hospital Compare, and the Hospital Con- (Table 1) .
Another empirical challenge in studying the impact of hospital closures is that hospital closure can be correlated with both the patient characteristics and the market structure. Such endogeneity can bias the estimate of the hospital closure e↵ect on the outcomes of our interest. To overcome this challenge, we use an extensive set of covariates, including patient level clinical and demographic information, as well as hospital and area level information such as provider supply, concentration, and the insurance market structure. As a main empirical strategy, we utilize the substantial geographic variation and the timing of U.S. hospital closures along with a multilevel panel data to make use of di↵erence-in-di↵erence (DID) analysis with the hospital, area, and year fixed e↵ects.
The DID analysis has enabled us to use both cohort and time dimensions, and thereby, adjust for time-invariant unobserved confounders. We use a matched sample that improves the comparability of the comparison groups. In addition to our primary analysis, we check the robustness of our findings by making use of various mechanisms, including an instrumental variable (IV) analysis. Our IV analysis utilizes the state level variation in the decision to expand Medicaid after the A↵ordable Care Act (ACA) to address the potential time-varying unobserved heterogeneity. 
Main Findings
Our results show that hospital closures have both positive and negative e↵ects on the nearby hospitals-and hence, the healthcare sector as a whole. On the positive side, when a hospital closes, the nearby hospitals experience an increase in patient volume, which translates into an improvement in their operational e ciency (i.e., the number of patients treated per unit of capacity).
Interestingly, however, we find that their bed utilization rates remain relatively constant, whereas their service duration significantly decreases. This implies that a speed-up behavior (i.e., improving e ciency via reducing service duration) rather than an e↵ort to lower the average bed idle time is the primary mechanism through which nearby hospitals improve their operational e ciency.
Because of such behavior, the gains in e ciency have negative implications on some (but not all)
aspects of care quality. In particular, we find that when a hospital closes, the 30-day mortality rate of its nearby hospitals substantially increases. We also observe that the e↵ect of hospital closures is highly heterogeneous and largely depends on market and hospital characteristics. For example, closure e↵ects are concentrated in the markets where patients have limited choice of hospitals (e.g., in rural areas). The e↵ect also highly varies by the characteristics of the neighbor hospital. Specifically, hospitals with more desirable characteristics (e.g., large, teaching, urban, or high-quality hospitals) experience greater spillover e↵ects.
Taken together, our results suggest that although hospital closures are e↵ective at improving the operational e ciency of the remaining (and nearby) hospitals, these hospitals do not necessarily improve their operational e ciency in the most desirable way. In particular, the improvement in operational e ciency-serving more patients per unit of capacity-is not due to more e↵ective use of beds, but rather due to spending less time on each patient. Spending less time on each patient may not necessarily be undesirable if it eliminates non-value adding procedures. However, our analyses show that it typically translates to a higher 30-day mortality rate. This suggests that at least some of the value-adding procedures are eliminated as a result of the speed-up behavior.
Furthermore, our results on the heterogeneous e↵ect of closures suggest that hospital closures widen social disparities: the adverse consequences, unfortunately, fall disproportionately among hospitals in areas with a limited choice of hospitals. It also increases the e ciency gap between the hospitals that are either able to accommodate greater patient volume or are more likely to be demanded by patients and the rest.
Finally, our counterfactual analyses aimed at providing policy recommendations indicate that targeted versions of (a) bailouts, and (b) monitoring and regulations of service durations are e↵ective policy levers. For example, bailing out the hospitals in markets with limited patient choice (e.g., rural hospitals) or those that have less desirable characteristics than their neighbors typically yields larger gains in quality than bailing out other hospitals. Focusing monitoring and regulation e↵orts on the hospitals in markets with limited patient choice or more desirable hospitals such as urban, non-profit, and teaching hospitals post-closure can also help policymakers take advantage of the positive e↵ects of hospital closures and mitigate their negative consequences. However, we conclude with a caveat that these targeted strategies typically come at a higher financial cost and can yield wider social disparities than their non-targeted versions.
Main Contributions
The contributions of our study are three-fold. 
Conceptual Framework and Hypotheses

Changes in Operational E ciency
We first examine if the closure of a hospital results in an improvement in the operational e ciency of its neighboring hospitals. As noted earlier, studies show that hospital closures can result in increased demand at the remaining hospitals in the area (Lindrooth et al. 2003 , Capps et al. 2010 ). Yet, it is not clear whether the increase in demand is consistent nationally.
More importantly, it is not clear whether this increase in demand translates to improved operational e ciency at nearby hospitals. Thus, we start by using our data to test the following:
Hypothesis 1. Closure of a hospital increases the operational e ciency of the nearby hospitals.
Our first hypothesis will enable us to test whether or not the closures have an increasing overall impact on the operational e ciency of the neighboring hospitals. However, it will not generate a detailed understanding of whether such an impact is favorable or unfavorable. For instance, improvement in operational e ciency might not stem from increasing bed utilization rate (i.e., accommodating the increased demand by lowering bed idle times). Given the low bed utilization rate of U.S. hospitals and the high cost of empty hospital beds, reducing bed idle time is a socially desirable way of improving operational e ciency.
In particular, conceptualizing a hospital as a general queueing system with s beds that play the role of servers, the throughput per bed /s-our measure of operational e ciency-can be expressed as /s = ⇢ ⇤ µ, where ⇢ is the bed utilization, and µ is the service rate such that 1/µ is the expected service duration. This implies that if s remains constant-hospitals typically cannot change their number of beds in the short term for various reasons, including the lengthy regulatory processes such as Certificate of Need (CON)-an increase in throughput corresponds to either (a) an increase only in ⇢, (b) a decrease only in 1/µ, or (c) both an increase in ⇢ and a decrease in 1/µ. Thus, to gain a deeper understanding of potential mechanisms through which operational e ciency might be a↵ected, we form two more hypotheses: one with respect to bed utilization (⇢) and one with respect to service duration (1/µ). We next discuss each of these separately.
Bed Utilization. U.S. hospitals have a wide range in their existing bed utilization rate. Although this can be partially described by di↵erences in average patient demand, there is a good level of discretion on a hospital to set its bed occupancy rate for reasons beyond current average demand (Joskow 1980, Green and Nguyen 2001) . Similarly, post-closure, nearby hospitals may accommodate the increased demand by either increasing their bed utilization rate or keeping their utilization rate the same, and instead responding to the closure in a di↵erent way. To gain insights into the e↵ect of hospital closure on the bed utilization rate, we examine the following:
Hypothesis 2. Closure of a hospital increases the bed utilization rate of the nearby hospitals.
Service Duration. As an alternative strategy in response to increased patient demand, hospitals may decrease their service duration. Operations management literature suggests that servers can be strategic about the service duration under financial and nonfinancial motivations, and alter their behavior based on the characteristics of the queue (Cachon and Zhang 2007, Debo et al. Article submitted to ; manuscript no. 2008 , Hopp et al. 2007 , Jouini et al. 2008 , Tan and Netessine 2014 , Oliva and Sterman 2001 . In particular, the visibility of the queue length or the server occupancy rate can encourage a speed-up behavior by servers (KC and Terwiesch 2012 , Batt and Terwiesch 2012 , Shunko et al. 2017 . In our setting, providers do not have full visibility of the entire queue. Furthermore, unlike the abovementioned literature, we are interested in studying changes at the organization (i.e., hospital) level as opposed to individual servers. Hence, it is not clear whether and to what extent the overall average service duration at a nearby hospital will change. To examine whether or not a hospital (as a whole) responds to the increased demand caused by a nearby hospital closure by decreasing its service duration, we test the following:
Hypothesis 3. Closure of a hospital decreases the service duration of the nearby hospitals.
Changes in Quality of Care
As noted earlier, it is unclear whether the e↵ect of hospital closures on the quality of care of the neighboring hospital is positive or negative. On the one hand, congested hospital systems are typically more vulnerable to provider errors and often less able to respond to a patient promptly.
Hence, a more congested hospital can result in an added risk to patient safety (KC and Terwiesch 2009 , Weissman et al. 2007 , Haas et al. 2018 as well as reduced patient satisfaction (Thompson et al. 1996) . On the other hand, an increase in patient volume can result in a better quality of care from learning and specialization. This is due to the well-established "volume-outcome" or "productivity spillover" e↵ects, which refer to the fact that healthcare providers improve their quality of care and patient outcomes with increased experience (Birkmeyer et al. 2002 , Ramanarayanan 2008 , Chandra and Staiger 2007 .
To gain a deeper understanding of the e↵ect of hospital closures on the quality of care delivered at nearby hospitals, we mainly focus on two dimensions of quality: patient experience and patient health outcomes. We examine the first dimension-patient experience-using a national survey of the inpatient care experience. For the second dimension-patient health outcomes-we measure 30-day readmission rates as well as 30-day mortality rates, the two widely-used outcome measures for inpatient services (Benbassat and Taragin 2000, Tourangeau et al. 2007 ). These enable us to test the following:
Hypothesis 4. Closure of a hospital changes the patient experience of the nearby hospitals.
Hypothesis 5. Closure of a hospital changes the 30-day readmission rate of the nearby hospitals.
Hypothesis 6. Closure of a hospital changes the 30-day mortality rate of the nearby hospitals.
Related Studies
Our work is related to the stream of literature that examines the relationship between the provider market structure (e.g., the provider supply and the regulatory environment) and the e ciency of the healthcare delivery system (Bates et al. 2006, Rosko and Mutter 2014) . Within this stream, some studies have investigated the impact of changes in the supply due to an exit of providers from the market on the remaining providers' e ciency. Lindrooth et al. (2003) , Capps et al. (2010) show that urban hospital closure improves the economic e ciency (i.e., costs per admission) of nearby hospitals through an increase in inpatient admissions, suggesting the existence of economies of scale.
Yet, Hodgson et al. (2015) suggests that hospital closures do not generate economies of scale, but merely shifts the high-cost patients to the remaining hospitals. A recent study provides a nuanced perspective by arguing that there are positive or negative economies of scale e↵ect depending on the type of services o↵ered at a hospital (Freeman et al. 2018 ). Our study is related to this stream of research: we examine the mechanisms through which hospitals' responses to a sudden change in patient demand a↵ect the economies of scale. However, unlike the studies mentioned above, instead of focusing on cost measures, we study the implications on operational e ciency and quality of care.
Our study is also relevant to the literature on the impact of provider market structure on healthcare quality. Among studies in this vein, our work mainly contributes to those that examine how the reduction in healthcare resources a↵ects the quality of care. A body of literature has studied the impact of hospital or emergency department closure on access to care or health outcomes for the population in the area (Joynt et al. 2015 , Buchmueller et al. 2006 , Capps et al. 2010 , Hsia et al. 2012 , Liu et al. 2014 , Carroll 2019 , Gujral and Basu 2019 . These studies show mixed evidence on the impact of hospital closures on patient outcomes. For example, Buchmueller et al. (2006) shows that hospital closures increase mortality from heart attacks and unintentional injuries, whereas Joynt et al. (2015) shows that there are no significant changes in mortality. Gujral and Basu (2019) and Carroll (2019) show that rural hospital closures resulted in an increase in mortality for time-sensitive conditions. While Buchmueller et al. (2006) , Carroll (2019) , Gujral and Basu (2019) demonstrate that hospital closures can have a negative consequence on patient health, they focus on the dimension of access by measuring the relationship between the increased travel distance (as a result of hospital closures) or loss of primary hospital and patient health. Unlike these studies that focus on the e↵ect of hospital closure on quality as a result of the changes in access, we examine how Article submitted to ; manuscript no.
patients who do not directly lose access are a↵ected through responses of the remaining hospitals.
Notably, our findings have implications both for the patients who directly lose access as well as those who are indirectly a↵ected through the spillover e↵ects that occur at nearby hospitals.
Data and Study Sample
Data
We obtained patient, hospital, and area level information by linking various data sources that include information for our study period (years 2005-2015 
Identifying Hospital Closures
We defined hospital closure as ceasing to deliver short-term general hospital services rather than the changes in the ownership or physical appearance of a hospital because we focus on the capacity pooling e↵ect of hospital beds. If a hospital remained in the same physical location but ceased to provide short-term acute care and converted to a di↵erent use such as an emergency department, rehabilitation facility, or long-term care facility, we regarded it as closure. However, absent such changes, if a hospital merely changed its name or ownership but stayed in the same physical location, we considered the hospital to be in operation. were eventually able to confirm the operating status of all hospitals on our list. Figure 1 of the Online Appendix shows the detailed steps through which we determined hospital closures. Table 2 shows the comparison of hospitals that were closed versus those that remained open during our study period. In general, the pre-closure characteristics of closed hospitals indicate clear signs of di culty: compared to hospitals that did not close, closed hospitals are in more competitive markets (measured by Herfindahl-Hirschman Index). They are less likely to be teaching or nonprofit, more likely to be rural, and more likely to have low operational e ciency and/or quality of care. Their patients are slightly older, less likely to be White, and tend to be poorer and sicker.
Study Sample
Our study sample of hospitals included all the Medicare-participating U.S. hospitals that were in operations throughout our study period. Among our sample, we considered hospitals that are either in the same or the nearest zip codes within the same state as the closed hospital as "treated," and the rest as "control." We defined the nearby hospital this way because our data shows that the majority of the patients that originally visited closed hospitals select the hospitals in the nearest zip codes. In our robustness checks, we use hospital referral regions (HRRs) instead of zip codes to identify nearby hospitals. In all analyses, we removed the closed hospitals from our study sample.
For each hospital in the treatment group, we defined the index year as the year of a nearby hospital's closure. We excluded the information from the index year to account for the noise during the transition period. We then compared outcomes pre-and post-closure. To be consistent, we years (see Table 8 ). Figure 2 in the Online Appendix shows our timeline of hospital closures for index years as well as pre-and post-closure observations.
For our patient level analysis, we considered the study population to be the FFS Medicare beneficiaries who paid at least one visit to the hospitals in our study sample. To improve the comparability, we further restricted the patient population to those who were aged 65 or older, did not have a disability, and were entitled to Medicare due to age (Although Medicare eligibility age is 65, Medicare also covers a small fraction of people under 65 with disabilities). Because patient's treatment status was based on the treatment status of the hospital they visited, a patient was allowed to be in both treatment and control groups if s/he made multiple visits to both treatment and control hospitals. We excluded transfers to or from another hospital, admissions for rehabilitation, and emergency department visits that did not result in inpatient admissions from the analysis. The methods we used for identifying these patients (e.g., through ICD-9 codes) are explained in the Online Appendix. As noted earlier and shown in Table 1 , there were a total of 4, 645, 532 patients in our final sample with a total of 14, 147, 180 inpatient visits during our study period (i.e., across 11 observation years) made to 3,299 open and 146 closed hospitals.
Dependent Variables
Our dependent variables include three operational measures (operational e ciency, bed utilization, and service duration) and three quality measures (patient experience, 30-day readmission, and 30-day mortality). Table 3 shows the definition of these variables, data sources used, and their corresponding hypotheses. For operational e ciency and bed utilization, we used the yearly average to address the seasonal and weekly variations in patient demand. For service duration, we used data on length of stay, but excluded observations with values greater than 30 days, as our goal is to examine the impact of closures on short-term acute care. For measuring 30-day readmission, we considered inpatient claims that were within 30 days of a previous hospitalization's discharge date.
For measuring 30-day mortality, we obtained death information from the Medicare denominator files and calculated the time to death as the number of days between the index discharge date and the date of death. We linked a hospitalization to an incidence of 30-day mortality if death was present within 30 days of discharge.
To study patient experience, we used the HCAHPS survey data collected by the CMS. HCAHPS is a national publicly reported survey for patients' perceptions of their hospital experience and is obtained by asking discharged patients questions about their hospital stay (see, e.g., Manary et al. (2013)). We used the overall patient's rating (1 for lowest and 10 for highest) as a primary outcome measure. Because we do not observe individual level responses, we defined a hospital's overall rating as the total percentage of patients who gave "high" ratings (rating of 9 or 10). We also examined the secondary outcomes from each of the nine core questions about patients' hospital experiences. These questions include communication with nurses and doctors, the responsiveness of hospital sta↵, the cleanliness and quietness of the hospital, pain management, communication about medications, discharge information, and whether the patient would recommend the hospital (see, e.g., Goldstein et al. (2005)). We excluded the hospitals that received fewer than 100 survey responses in a given year for this part of the analysis. For measuring overall hospital quality, we used Hospital Compare data (CMS 2018), which provides more comprehensive measures of hospital quality than HCAHPS (see Section 4.5). year. Second, to control for the changes in the degree of market competition, we constructed the Herfindahl-Hirschman Indices (HHIs) for hospitals-a standard measure of concentration-for each market (defined as HRRs) per year. Third, the level of the provider supply may a↵ect bed utilization and operational e ciency. Thus, we adjusted for the area level provider supply, such as the total number of primary care physicians and acute care hospitals per 10,000 persons from AHRF.
Independent Variables
Lastly, to adjust for any macro level socio-demographic factors, we controlled for the proportion of population unemployed, in poverty, or aged 16 or older for each county from AHRF.
Main Empirical Analysis
Empirical Strategy Overview
Our main empirical strategy is a DID approach with hospital, market, and year fixed e↵ects to examine the changes in hospital and patient outcomes before and after a hospital closure event.
This approach allows for controlling observed and unobserved heterogeneity between the treatment and control group that is constant over time. If the parallel trend assumption is met, DID analysis can provide a causal interpretation of the treatment e↵ect. We used a fixed e↵ects model instead of a random e↵ects model, because the hospital or market e↵ects are likely correlated with the observed patient or hospital characteristics. We used hospital level instead of patient level fixed e↵ect since a large proportion of patients had only one hospital visit. We used a robust standard error clustered at hospital-year to account for the correlation of error terms.
We employed the following model for testing hospital level outcomes (hypotheses 1, 2 and 4):
To test the patient level outcomes (hypotheses 3, 5, and 6), we utilized the following model:
In both models (1) and (2) X is a vector of patient characteristics, including age, gender, race, Medicare entitlement, Medicaid dual-eligibility, chronic conditions, comorbidity, admission type, and diagnosis type. Z is a vector of area characteristics, including managed care penetration (i.e., the proportion of patients who own managed care insurance plans per market), HHI, provider supply measures, and socioeconomic measures. ✏ is the error term. Indices i, j, and t represent a patient, a hospital, and a year, respectively. Bold notation is used to represent vectors.
To improve the comparability of our treatment and control groups, we made use of matching in our main analyses. Specifically, we first estimated the propensity score of being in the treatment and control groups using a logistic regression model where we employed the following matching criteria separately: (a) hospital characteristics only (size, academic status, ownership, location, funding, and quality) and (b) hospital characteristics along with patient characteristics (age, gender, race, dual status, and admission type). We then utilized the nearest-neighbor matching method without replacement. Because of the imbalance between the numbers of hospitals in the treatment and control group, matching resulted in a fewer number of study sample: 243 hospitals for hospital-only based matching and 239 hospitals for hospital and patient-based matching. The balance statistics of the matched groups can be found in Table 1 of the Online Appendix. As part of our robustness checks, we repeat our analyses without matching (see section 7). Finally, to gain further confidence, we revise models (1) and (2), and examine the temporal trend of closure e↵ects by separately measuring our outcome variables for each observation year.
Assumptions
The main assumption of our fixed e↵ect DID model is that conditioned on the unobserved fixed di↵erences by groups, each observation-specific error term is uncorrelated with the explanatory variables in all periods (i.e., strict exogeneity holds). We control for multiple dimensions of timevarying proxies for health, socio-economic status, and market characteristics such as insurance penetration and competition level in our analyses to address potential violations of the strict exogeneity assumption. However, there might still be two major threats to this assumption.
First, there can be a patient-level selection that is correlated with hospital closures. For example, sicker patients may have chosen a particular hospital and have contributed to its closure, and then their influx to neighbor hospital after closure could have contributed to increased adverse outcomes.
Since our controls (e.g., our proxies for health) might have not fully captured this endogeneity, we perform our analyses after eliminating the patients of closed hospitals from our sample. Furthermore, we note that this endogenous selection process is rather static because underlying clinical or socio-economic di↵erences for healthcare are typically stable in the short term (see also Fiscella et al. (2000) . These give us confidence that our results are not a↵ected by such a patient-level selection process.
Another critical assumption in our DID analyses is the parallel trend, which posits that the di↵erences between the treatment and control groups are constant over time. The assumption is not formally testable, but we show that the pre-treatment outcomes do have a parallel trend ( Figure 3 of the Online Appendix). To gain further confidence, we also test for the common trend between the treatment and the control group before the treatment year by including the interaction term of treatment variable with each pre-treatment year. We find that the pre-treatment trends are not significantly di↵erent between the two groups prior to the treatment year ( Finally, because we cannot completely verify the extent to which these unmeasurable aspects bias our results, we use an instrumental variable (IV) approach as part of our robustness checks (see Section 7.2). This IV approach further mitigates the concerns mentioned above and gives us assurance about the validity of our results.
Results and Discussions
Summary Statistics
An average hospital in our data serves 9,724 patients per year, with the operational e ciency of 46 (patients per bed per year), and bed utilization of 54% (see Table 3 in the Online Appendix). The Article submitted to ; manuscript no.
average service duration, 30-day readmission rate, and 30-day mortality rate are 4.81 days, 16%, and 6%, respectively, which are consistent with the existing literature (see, e.g., Joynt et al. (2011) , Bueno et al. (2010) ). Compared to the hospitals in the control group, hospitals in the treatment group are more likely to be teaching, public, and urban (Table 5 ). They are also more likely to be located in a competitive market, which is consistent with our results that hospitals in competitive markets are more likely to close. Patients in the treatment group are slightly older, less likely to be male or White race, more likely to be low-income, and sicker (Table 5 ). We adjust these di↵erences in hospital and patient characteristics in our DID analysis. Figure 2 and Table 6 show the DID results of our main model for our hospital and patient level outcomes, respectively. The full results are presented in Table 4 of the Online Appendix. Our results indicate that hospitals improve their operational e ciency after the closure of nearby hospitals by 1.6 additional discharges per bed (equivalent to 3.5% increase) in the post-closure years, and this change is statistically significant (hypothesis 1). To test if the e ciency gain is driven by an increase in patient volume as opposed to a change in hospitals' capacity, we separately examine the changes in volume and capacity. We see a substantial increase in patient volume, but no significant increase in the number of beds (see Table 5 of the Online Appendix). While the bed utilization rate also increases by about 2.1% in the post-closure years, this increase is not statistically significant (hypothesis 2). The log length of stay of the remaining hospitals, however, decreases by a statistically significant amount of 2.3%, which translates to one out of every five patients being released a day earlier (hypothesis 3).
Average E↵ect
There is no statistically significant change in overall patient experience ratings after hospital closures (hypothesis 4). When the ratings for each of the nine domain for the patient experience is examined separately, two out of nine domains (doctor communication and sta↵ explanation) show a significant reduction in quality ( Overall, we find evidence of e ciency improvement following a closure event as measured by the number of patients served per bed per unit of time. Although hospitals improve their e ciency, such an improvement is not due to an increase in bed utilization (lower bed idle times): a decrease in service duration-a speed-up behavior-is the main reason behind the e ciency improvement in the remaining hospitals. Importantly, indicating both a decrease in service duration and an increase in 30-day mortality rate, our results suggest that the remaining hospitals likely respond to the increased demand caused by a nearby hospital closure through eliminating some value-added care steps.
Heterogeneous E↵ect by Market and Closure Characteristics
The spillover e↵ect of closure may depend on the market environment. For example, in a competitive market, hospital closure could be driven by market forces. To generate further insights into the Article submitted to ; manuscript no. role of market characteristics, we stratified our study sample based on characteristics such as the level of competition (measured by HHI) and resources (measured by the number of inpatient hospitals per population). Figure 3 (and Table 7 of the Online Appendix) shows that the neighbor hospitals in less competitive or lower resource markets (i.e., where there are fewer remaining choice of hospitals after a hospital closes) experience a greater increase in e ciency, greater reduction in service duration, and a greater increase in adverse patient outcomes. This suggests that bailing out hospitals in areas where patients have fewer choices (e.g., rural areas) can be an e↵ective strategy in mitigating the negative consequences of closures on quality of care while bailing out hospitals in opposite markets might be a more e↵ective strategy in improving the overall operational e ciency.
We test the consequence of utilizing these and similar levers that can be used by policymakers in Section 8.
Heterogeneous E↵ect by Hospital Characteristics
We next examined the heterogeneous spillover e↵ect of closures based on neighbor hospitals' characteristics (academic status, quality, location, and size). Our results are presented in Figure 4 (see also Table 8 of the Online Appendix) and show that, after a hospital closes, the neighbor hospitals that are generally considered to be more desirable (e.g., teaching, high quality, urban, and large) experience a significant increase in e ciency. In contrast, less desirable (e.g., non-teaching, low quality, rural, and small) hospitals do not experience any significant changes in e ciency. This suggests that the e↵ect of hospital closures is not uniform even in the same market; it depends largely on hospital characteristics. This o↵ers further opportunities for policymakers to target their policies not only at specific markets but also at specific hospitals (see Section 8 for our detailed policy recommendations). Furthermore, we note that the more desirable hospitals that gained e ciency tend to be the ones that also experienced a significant increase in 30-day mortality. Since the gain in e ciency is mainly due to a speed-up behavior, this suggests that the speed-up response of the nearby hospitals-particularly by the more desirable hospitals-is the main driving force behind the increase in 30-day mortality. In Table 9 of the Online Appendix, we formally test the mechanism that drives the increase in 30-day mortality. The results support our main finding: hospitals that accommodate the increased demand following a nearby hospital closure by improving their e ciency do so through a speed-up behavior, which most likely involves the elimination of some value-added care delivery procedures.
Robustness
Robustness Check Using Instrumental Variable (IV) Analysis
As noted in Section 5.2, our fixed e↵ects model may not fully address the time-varying unobservable confounders that can bias our results. Therefore, we incorporated an IV analysis in our DID design (i.e., instrumented di↵erence-in-di↵erences, or DDIV) by identifying an IV that can account for unmeasured confounders (De Chaisemartin and D'HaultfOEuille 2017, Duflo 2001) . Specifically, we made use of the state level variations in the decision to expand Medicaid as an instrument that influences the likelihood of hospital closures but is unlikely to be correlated with our outcome variables. The A↵ordable Care Act (ACA) originally intended to expand Medicaid coverage to low-income adults, but the provision was ruled coercive by the supreme court. Therefore, each state could choose to expand or not expand Medicaid, which created a variation in Medicaid eligibility by state. Evidence shows that the expansion is associated with improved hospital financial performance and a lower likelihood of hospital closure (Lindrooth et al. 2018 , Blavin 2016 . Using these facts, we specified our first-stage equation as:
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where MEDICAID jt denotes whether hospital j's state expanded Medicaid in year t and POSTCLOSURE jt indicates whether the neighbor hospital of hospital j is closed in year t. Our second-stage equation for hospital level outcomes is
and for patient level outcomes is
where \ POSTCLOSURE is the estimated value from the first-stage equation (3), and IV is the impact of hospital closures on outcome variables adjusting for the selection using the instrument.
The key assumptions for our IV approach are: (1) the instrument does not a↵ect the outcome except through treatment (exclusion restriction), and (2) the instrument is associated with the treatment variable (Hudson et al. 2017) . Available studies in the literature suggest that Medicaid expansion-our IV-is strongly correlated with our treatment variable (see, e.g., Lindrooth et al. (2018) ), and hence, assumption (2) holds. Our direct tests on the level of correlation between Medicare expansion and our treatment variable further confirm this (see Table 7 ).
However, unlike assumption (2), we cannot directly test assumption (1). Several studies suggest that although Medicaid expansion is associated with the changes in payer mix and financial margins of the hospitals, it does not impact their overall use or patterns of inpatient care (Pines et al. 2016 , Freedman et al. 2017 , Pickens et al. 2018 . Nevertheless, to gain further confidence, we tested if Medicaid expansion is associated with changes in the hospital level outcomes among hospitals that Weak identification (F-stat) 91.62
Note. The F-statistics test for identifying the weak instrument is based on (Stock and Yogo 2002) . The rule of thumb suggests that a first stage F-statistic below 10 indicates the presence of weak instruments. All models include hospital, area, and year fixed e↵ects. Standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the hospital and the year levels. *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
are in the control group. Our results suggest that assumption (2) most likely holds for hospital level outcomes (see Table 10 of the Online Appendix). For patient level outcomes, we note that because our study population is Medicare beneficiaries who have already had insurance coverage, the expansion of Medicaid is unlikely to a↵ect their care patterns.
In addition to the two above-mentioned assumptions required for an IV approach, the DDIV approach that we employ requires two more assumptions: (3) in the absence of treatment, the di↵erence between the treatment and control group is constant over time, and hence, shows a parallel trend, and (4) the e↵ect of the instrument is monotone (Hudson et al. 2017) . Assumption (4) is well-satisfied, since once a hospital closes, it will stay closed throughout the study period by our definition of a closure. To verify the parallel trend assumption in (3), we examined the pre-expansion trends of the treatment group's outcomes by expansion status. Our results indicate that the parallel trend assumption most likely holds. However, it should be noted that our IV estimate is applicable only to the hospitals whose behaviors are influenced by the IV. In addition, the instrument generates a variation at the state level, so within-state unobservable di↵erences between the treatment and the control groups may still remain. Despite these, our IV analysis helps to validate the findings from our primary analysis and provide us with a useful additional robustness check mechanism. Table 7 shows the result of the first stage and second stage regression estimates (Equations (3)-(5)). The first column shows that Medicaid expansion is a significant predictor of fewer closures of nearby hospitals. The subsequent columns show the impact of hospital closures on the nearby hospital's operational e ciency and quality. The fact that the results of our IV analysis and the DID analysis are consistent gives us confidence that our results are fairly robust.
Robustness Check Using Temporal E↵ects
We further examined the robustness of our results by studying the temporal trend of closure e↵ects (i.e., by separately measuring the e↵ect for each observation year). We employed the following model for testing hospital level outcomes (hypotheses 1, 2, and 4):
To test patient level outcomes (hypotheses 3, 5, and 6), we utilized the following model:
In both models (1) and (2), POSTYEAR1, · · · , POSTYEAR5 are binary variables that indicate that the observation is made in each of the post-closure years for the treated group. All other variables are the same as our main equations.
Our results (see Figure 4 of the Online Appendix) show that the e↵ects of hospital closures discussed earlier persist over time, though their magnitudes typically decrease. This diminishing e↵ect could be due to other contemporaneous market or policy changes that mask the closure e↵ect. For example, many markets have experienced either an opening or an additional closure of hospitals within five years of closure. Alternatively, the diminishing e↵ect could suggest that hospitals get accustomed to the increased demand over time. Nevertheless, the fact that we observe the same directional e↵ects for every post-closure year as those in our main analyses gives us further confidence that our results are robust during our entire study period.
Other Robustness Checks
To gain further confidence in the validity of our results, we also performed various other robustness checks. Here, we first describe them and then discuss the resulting observations. Unmatched Sample. We repeated our analyses using the original sample data instead of using the matched sample.
Treatment Variable. We repeated our analyses using an alternative area-based definition of the treatment variable. Specifically, we assigned all hospitals located in the same healthcare market that experienced at least one closure to the treatment group, where the market was defined as an HRR.
Patients of Closed Hospitals. Because the patients of closed hospitals are poorer and sicker (Table 2) , it is possible that the unobservable changes in patient composition contribute to the increase in mortality. Thus, we removed the patients of closed hospitals from the study population and re-estimated the closure e↵ect.
Travel Distance. The changes in the travel distance as a result of closure may have contributed to the increased mortality. Thus, we repeated our analyses after including the average distance between patients and hospitals (using patients' and hospitals' zip code centroids).
Observations Years. As another robustness checks, we included additional observation years for the hospital level outcomes. Specifically, we repeated our analyses after including observational years 2001-2004 and 2016-2017 , which we removed from our main analysis for comparability with the observation years for the patient level data (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) (2014) (2015) .
Placebo Test. We randomly assigned hospital closures to some hospitals and patients in the control group and re-estimated the model with the placebo-treated group. We also assigned the treatment to hospitals in the years before the closure year as a placebo treatment and again reestimated the model.
All of the changes resulted in observations that are reasonably consistent with our primary analysis (Table 8 ). In particular, the results of our various robustness checks indicate that our main findings are fairly robust: hospital closures increase the operational e ciency of nearby hospitals, but have negative consequences on some aspects of quality of care, including the mortality rate.
When the market based treatment definition was used, service duration decreased marginally (pvalue < 0.1), likely since more hospitals (especially the ones farther away from the closed hospitals) are included in the treatment group. When the patients of closed hospitals were removed, despite removing about 24% of the patients in the treatment group, service duration decreased with statistical significance, and mortality increased marginally. The results of the placebo test showed no significant closure e↵ect on all outcomes. Furthermore, the estimates of the rest of the outcomes were all consistent with our primary results. Finally, the fact that removing the patients of closed hospitals and adding the changes in distance does not a↵ect the spillover e↵ect strengthens the interpretation of the speed-up behavior as the driver of adverse patient outcomes.
Policy Implications
Our results suggest that there are at least two policy levers that could be utilized by policymakers and hospital administrators to harness the positive spillover e↵ect of hospital closures and/or mitigate their negative consequences. First, the fact that the e↵ect of hospital closure depends on the market and hospital characteristics indicates that bailing out hospitals that have specific characteristics or are in particular markets can have a strong impact. Second, policies that can Article submitted to ; manuscript no. eliminate the speed-up behavior (e.g., appropriate monitoring and regulations against reductions in service durations) post a nearby hospital closure can be beneficial. In order to provide clear policy recommendations based on our results, we now perform various counterfactual analyses and examine the e↵ectiveness of these policy levers (had they been utilized).
Policy Lever 1: Selective Hospital Closures and Bailouts
For policymakers, knowing "which" hospitals they should close or bail out under considerations of e ciency and quality can be highly informative. For example, there has been an ongoing debate on cutting the Medicaid DSH payment program or reforming the CAH status for financial supporttwo programs that, roughly speaking, try to bail out specific hospitals and prevent them from potential closures. While these programs help to support safety-net hospitals that are not viable under market competition forces (Neuhausen et al. 2014 , Bazzoli et al. 2014 , they have been controversial for being costly and also negatively a↵ecting the e ciency of the healthcare system.
Based on the current distribution of the characteristics of U.S. hospitals, we examined hypothetical scenarios of closures to estimate the spillover e↵ect their neighbors (and thus, the healthcare system) experience. First, for market-based scenarios, we estimated the expected increase in operational e ciency and 30-day mortality to the neighboring hospitals when a hospital in a market with a low (high) competition or a low (high) resource closes. We divided the markets into an equal number of high versus low competition and high versus low resources markets and randomly chose one hospital in each market (N = 306) as a closing hospital, resulting in N = 153 closures. Second, for hospital-based scenarios, we examined the scenarios of closures based on their relative desirability (teaching, high-quality, urban, and large) compared to their neighbors. We randomly selected N = 153 hospitals such that the characteristics of our interest are either more or less desirable relative to their neighbors. We estimated the e↵ect of hospital closures on the neighbor hospitals' e ciency and 30-day mortality using the estimated parameters from the Equations (1) and (2), holding all other characteristics (other than neighbor's closures) constant. Finally, we calculated the mean changes in outcomes. that there is no dominant strategy that improves both e ciency and patient outcomes, as the increase in e ciency tends to be present with an increase in mortality. There is also wide heterogeneity in the magnitude of policy e↵ect, which suggests that choosing specific types of hospitals to bail out can make a substantial di↵erence in overall impact. If greater weight is placed on reducing the adverse consequence in mortality as opposed to improving e ciency, our results recommend bailing out hospitals that are in the areas with fewer choices of hospitals (e.g., in rural areas) or those that have less desirable characteristics than their neighbors.
Policy Lever 2: Selective Elimination of Speed-up Behavior
Current studies on the interventions related to the speed of medical care focus on reducing the service time for time-sensitive conditions such as stroke care in emergency department settings (Fonarow et al. 2011 , Meretoja et al. 2012 . Limited data exist, however, on interventions that can slow down the service to conserve value-added care. In the absence of such data, we focused on estimating the maximum achievable benefits from eliminating the speed-up behavior. Our empirical findings suggest that the hospitals that speed up increase their e ciency by reducing the service duration while keeping the bed utilization rate constant. Thus, we examined the hypothetical scenario when hospitals respond to the increase in patient demand by increasing their bed utilization Article submitted to ; manuscript no. rate instead of changing their service duration. Because the changes in service duration a↵ect the 30-day mortality, we also estimate the reduction in mortality as a result of eliminating the speed-up behavior.
Using our main model, we first predicted the changes in service duration in the absence of the speed-up behavior and translated it into the number of additional patient days for each hospital by multiplying the changes in service duration with the annual patient volume. Using the predicted bed days and service duration, we then re-estimated the impact of the closure on bed utilization and mortality. Our results show that without the speed-up behavior, a hospital's closure will, on average, increase its neighbors' bed utilization by 2.2%, and reduce their 30-day mortality rate by 0.08%.
Next, we considered the cases where only certain types of hospitals based on the market or hospital characteristics are targeted to eliminate their speed-up behavior. Figure 5(b) shows the potential gains in bed utilization and the reduction in mortality via policy interventions aimed at eliminating the speed-up behavior (e.g., monitoring and regulating service durations) compared to the status quo where hospitals speed up their services. We observe that in implementing policy lever 2, targeting specific markets where patients have limited choices of hospitals (e.g., rural) or targeting specific hospitals such as urban, non-profit, and teaching (as opposed to rural, forprofit, private, or non-teaching hospitals) is a dominant strategy. This means that policymakers can focus their monitoring and regularization e↵orts of service durations on these types of markets or hospitals so as to gain the best results.
Limitations
Our study has several limitations. First, our outcome variables are based on two di↵erent data sources, where the data on patient outcomes is a subset of the data on hospital outcomes. However, we find that these two data sources provide consistent findings. Specifically, both datasets consistently suggest evidence of the speed-up behavior. Moreover, although patient mortality was measured only among Medicare patients, the patient experience that was measured by considering both Medicare and non-Medicare patients showed similar evidence of quality reduction.
A second limitation of our study is the existence of contemporaneous policy changes and their e↵ects, especially after the enactment of the ACA. For example, hospitals' readmission rates are likely a↵ected by other ongoing changes from the payment reforms such as the Hospital Readmission Reduction Program-a pay-for-performance program that penalizes hospitals with too many readmissions. We adjusted for year-specific shocks and estimated the year-specific treatment e↵ect to mitigate this concern, but the e↵ect of policy changes may vary in a way that is unsolvable to us.
Finally, as we discussed in Section 5.2, our results are limited by the limitations of the DID method we utilized. We employed several alternative strategies to address such limitations, including an IV approach to examine the time-varying omitted variable bias on the hospital level outcomes. Although the results of the IV analysis on hospital outcomes are consistent with our main results, the consistency is valid to an extent the assumptions of IV analysis is valid. We also included an extensive set of covariates in our model, performed a variety of robustness checks, and examined the assumptions on strict exogeneity and the parallel trend. Overall, our supplementary analyses and various sensitivity tests give us confidence that our results are reasonably robust.
Nevertheless, future research can further verify our findings.
Conclusion
We examined how an exit of a hospital from a market a↵ects the remaining hospitals' operational e ciency and quality. Our results indicate that in response to the increase in patient demand, nearby hospitals improve their operational e ciency. However, this improvement in operational e ciency is not due to better utilization of resources but is instead due to a speed-up behavior as a response to the increase in demand. This speed-up behavior allows the remaining hospitals to serve more patients with their current level of resources. There is, however, an important negative consequence on some aspects of quality of care, especially an increase in the 30-day mortality rate.
Furthermore, the spillover e↵ect of hospital closures is heterogeneous and is stronger when the Article submitted to ; manuscript no.
nearby hospitals have more desirable characteristics (e.g., large, teaching, urban, or high-quality hospitals) or are in markets where patients have limited choices of hospitals (e.g., in rural areas).
Our empirical findings and counterfactual analyses suggest that targeted versions of some policies can be e↵ective in harnessing the positive impacts of hospital closures and mitigating their negative consequences. For example, we find that (a) bailing out hospitals that are in areas where patients have limited choices of hospitals or those that have less desirable characteristics than their neighbors, and (b) reducing the speed-up of the hospitals in areas where patients have limited choices of hospitals or that have specific characteristics (e.g., urban, non-profit, and teaching) could be e↵ective policies. Our results can be helpful for the current policy debates on the rural hospital closures by showing that the targeted policy interventions that invest in rural hospitals can be e↵ective. It should be noted, however, that our study has focused on understanding the spillover e↵ect of closures (and thus these policies) in the dimensions of e ciency and quality, but policymakers should also consider other dimensions such as cost and equity. For example, while our study has not focused on the cost dimension, our estimates of the cost based on the cost of increased length of stay from previous studies (Bartel et al. 2014 , Taheri et al. 2000 suggest that the average intervention cost for large hospitals can be up to five times greater than that of small hospitals ( Figure 5 of the Online Appendix). Thus, it is likely that our policy recommendations are more costly than some other potential policies. As such, we emphasize that policymakers need to weigh the advantages and disadvantages of our policy recommendations carefully and accordingly adopt the best strategy.
In addition to policymakers, our findings can also help hospital administrators to adopt suitable strategies in response to a neighboring hospital closure. From hospitals' perspectives, the surge of patient demand as a result of a nearby hospital's closure may present as an opportunity for improving profit margins. In particular, because Medicare pays for inpatient services mainly based on diagnosis-related groups (DRGs) that classify patients of similar clinical characteristics and costs rather than the length of stay, the strategy of speeding up to treat more patients might maximize the hospital's revenue in short-term. Our results, however, point out that such a strategy can adversely a↵ect their hospitals' long-term sustainability. In light of the recent payment reforms that emphasize the role of hospital quality outcomes (The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services 2017) and the growing role for hospitals' quality outcomes on patients' choice Hopp 2019, 2020) , hospital administrators should be aware that deterioration in key quality measures as a result of speed-up can result in a loss of patient share for their hospital.
